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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/AppellantCross-Appellee,
vs.

DARRELL DEAN ANDERSON,
Defendant/AppelleeCross-Appellant.
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE BRIEF
In their reply brief the State noted that defendant addressed the following two
issues in his cross-appeal:
I.

Whether the trial courts conclusion of law that the defendant had a prior conviction
for domestic violence was supported by adequate facts to reach this conclusion.

2.

Whether the definition off "cohabitant" in subdivision (c) of Utah Code §30-61(2) is facially vague and ambiguous as applied to the defendant.

POINT NUMBER ONE
THE TRIAL"-' ~FR! ;. ~!LED TO FACTUALLY SUPPORT ITS
t ~

:NCLUSION THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD A PRE\:~ n:--,

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONVJf'TH ~~~Standard of review:

An appellate court will review " ... a trial court's legal

conclusions for correctness, according the trial court no particular deference." Orton v.

I

Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); State v. Barnett, 2005 UT App. 88, ~ 14, 127

P.3d 682. This review will include a determination of whether the court's conclusions of
law are "predicated upon and find support in the findings of fact", Gilmor v. Wright, 850
P.2d 431, 436 (Utah 1983). These findings must be articulated with sufficient detail so
that the basis of the ultimate conclusion can be understood. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co., 776 P.2d 896 (899)(Utah 1989).
ARGUMENT

The plaintiff mistakenly asserts the trial court's findings are sufficient to support
the legal conclusion defendant had a prior domestic violence conviction. (R395-396).
However, the record does not support this conclusion. The defendant in his cross-appeal
(Dfs. BR, pp. 9-1 0) noted that the plea in abeyance was only entered to disorderly
conduct. The charging citation with the "D. V." notation issued by the Roy City Police
Department is not determinative of what occurred in this case. If this were so, all
misdemeanor citations issued with a "D. V." notation would automatically allow the
issuing officer to make the ultimate decision that domestic violence had occuned and
was the proper charge. At the defendant's hearing for the violation of his plea in
abeyance, because Judge Baldwin was unable to determine factually that the defendant
had originally plead to a domestic violence related charge, he entered the conviction
against the defendant for the disorderly conduct charge only. (R352).
In light of Judge Baldwin's uncertainty regarding the Roy court proceeding, it was
incumbent upon Judge Dutson to articulate with clarity the underlying facts upon which

2

he based his legal conclusion that the defendant had a prior domestic violence conviction.
"Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error,
unless the facts in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a
finding in favor of the judgment.' "(Emphasis added.) "The findings of fact must show that
the Court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence.
The findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."
Butler, Crockett, et. al. v. Pinecrest Pipeline, 909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995).
POINT NUMBER TWO
SUBDIVISION (C) OF UTAH CODE §30-6-1(2), DEFINING
"COHABITANT" AS "A PERSON ... WHO: (C) IS RELATED BY
BLOOD OR MARRIAGE TO THE OTHER PARTY" IS
OVERBROAD AND IMPERMISSIBLY VAGUE, AS APPLIED TO
THE DEFENDANT.
Standard of review:

The plaintiff correctly cites State v. Norris, 2007 UT 5,

"Whether a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague is a question of law reviewed
for correctness." "When addressing such a challenge, the court presumes that the statute
is valid, and resolves any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." State v.
Morrison, 31 P.3d 547, ~ 5 (Utah 2001), citing internally State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24,
980 P.2d 191.

3

~

6,

ARGUMENT
The assertion by the plaintiff that the defendant did not have "standing" to
challenge the constitutional infirmities of subdivision (c) of Utah Code §30--6-1 (2) is
patently incorrect. The record is clear that the language of subdivision (c) was the basis
for enhancing the charges against the defendant to felonies against the defendant. The
plaintiffs reliance on Norris to assert the defendant lacked standing is incorrect. The
court in Norris declined to consider the constitutional challenges, noting the defendant, by
entering an unconditional guilty plea, had waived his right to challenge the basis of his
conviction on the merits.
The essence of the defendant's argument is that the definition of"cohabitant" in
subdivision (c) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague as it was applied to him. The
definition fails to provide the kind of notice that would enable ordinary people to
understand what prohibited conduct was applied to them, and the statute encourages
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. State v. McGuire, 84 P.3d 1171 (Utah 2004).
The "void-for-vagueness" doctrine requires the legislature to define the criminal offence
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. University

of Utah v. Shurtleff, 2006 UT 51. The legislature has given the term "cohabitant" specific
meaning by expressly defining what a cohabitant is for purposes of Utah's Cohabitant
Abuse Act. The Act defines a "cohabitant" as "an emancipated person ... or a person of 16
years of age or older who ... (c) is related by blood or marriage to the other party .... , In

Greenwood v. City ofNorth Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, the court noted "The void-for4

vagueness doctrine requires ... that a legislature establish a minimal guide to govern law
enforcement."
This court, in Keene v. Basner, 107 P.3d 693 (Utah App. 2005) gave direction for
analyzing the definition of "cohabitant" as used in the spousal abuse connotation, but
noted that a court "must make a factual determination on a case-by-case basis."(Keene, ~
6) While this court has previously determined that the application of the definition of a
"cohabitant" is confined to the content of cohabitant abuse, see Hill v. Hill, 968 P .2d 866,
868 (Utah App. 1998), appellate courts in Utah have not specifically addressed just how
broadly the Act's definition of "cohabitant" is to be construed, in the context of "related
by blood or marriage."
The term "related by blood or marriage" is ambiguous and vague, providing no
guidelines as to the context in which it applies. "When it is obvious that an attempt to
give a statute universal and literal application leads to incongruous results which were
never intended, the statute should be considered in light of its background and purpose,
together with other aspects of the law which have a bearing on the problem involved."

State v. Bradshaw, 2004 UT 298. "The purpose of the Cohabitant Abuse Act was to
create a timely and simplified process whereby some level of protection and safety could
be afforded to victims who had previously been outside the umbrella of orders available
to persons involved in criminal prosecutions. These orders would require the parties
subject to the protective order to leave the victim alone and provide for some measurable
and enforceable safeguards, as determined by the court." Bailey v. Bayles, 18 P.3d 1129,
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n4. In view of the fact that it is possible for one to be related by blood, but have no
knowledge of that relationship, this language has the constitutional infirmity of
vagueness. The term "related by marriage" is equally vague. For instance, would this
language apply to a common law relationship?
The interpretive standards, provided by appellate courts, would suggest that this
court rule that the definition of "cohabitant" contained in subdivision (c) of Utah Code
§30-6-1(2) is vague, as it is applied to the defendant. The purpose of the Cohabitant
Abuse Act, as set forth by this court in Bailey v. Bayles, ibid., does not justify the
determination that the language of subdivision (c), i.e., " ... related by blood or marriage ... "
should be applied to the defendant.
The disorderly conduct citation given to the defendant stems from an incident
which occurred on August 22, 2002, while the original incident involving the victim, the
defendant's wife, did not occur until August 2003, approximately a year later. Simply
stated, there is no nexis between the actions involving the father-in-law and those
involving the victim a year later.
When interpreting a statute, the reviewing court seeks to "evidence the true intent
and purpose of the legislature," which, absent ambiguity, is best derived from the statute's
plain meaning. State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 23 (~52, 60 and 63 P.3d 621.) More
significantly, the phrase "related by marriage" is not defined by the legislature, and is
ambiguous as to its meaning. The term could apply to an alleged "common law"
relationship, a relationship between cousins, brother- or sister-in-laws, etc. It is
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ambiguous with regard to determining whether, as with the defendant, a father-in-law can
be considered to be "related by marriage." Appellant, on page 10 of their reply brief,
notes "The Cohabitant Abuse Act is defined for the purpose of protecting persons against
abuse or domestic violence ... any cohabitant who has been subject to abuse or domestic
violence may seek an ex-parte protective order ... ". (App BR, p.lO.)
The definition contained in subdivision (c), as applied to the defendant, is void
for vagueness, and does not provide guidelines to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. The definition failed to provide the defendant with knowledge that he was
within the ambit of the definition.
In conclusion, it is therefore submitted that subdivision (c) of the statute is
impermissibly vague as to its application. Given the difficulty in determining what
"related by marriage" means, and to whom it must apply, a person of normal intelligence
familiar with the language of this subsection would not know what behavior is being
criminalized and allows for the arbitrary and capricious application of the definition.
The Appellee/Cross-Appellant respectfully requests this court to find subdivision (c)
vague and overbroad, as it applies to him.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Aay of

f{tl.f~

2007.

~ ;2 M~CALVER
Attorney for Appellee/Cross-Appellant
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